While emotions are multifaceted phenomena, it seems there are some elements which are essential components of a comprehensive theory of emotion— specifically involving intentionality and how it might manifest cross-specially, viewed from cognitivist and Darwinian frameworks. While the gap between primitive emotion and intentional mental states has been a continual dilemma in studies of emotion, we may be able to reach a more inclusive theory by reevaluating the preconditions of intentionality and emphasizing the continuous interaction between neurophysiological responses and cognitive evaluation.

      In John Deigh’s Primitive Emotions , the author identifies the two central facts which a theory of emotion must include, the first being that “emotions are intentional states in the sense that they are directed at something,” (Deigh, p.9, para.1) and the second being that “emotions are common to both humans and beasts” (Deigh, p.9, para.2). Various theories of emotion have grappled with these factors, though usually struggle to provide an account inclusive of both; cognitive approaches rely heavily on the intentionality of emotions, but have trouble explaining this in the context of non-human animals, and Darwinian theories easily accommodate the emotions of such animals, but struggle to reconcile this with intentionality. This “gap” which both theories have is one between primitive emotion and intentional mental states, the former of which seems to predate the capacity for the latter (Deigh, p.10, para.3). 

Attendant upon such theories of intentionality is the capacity for language, as the cognitivists view emotions as being inherently propositional, but Deigh points out that the judgment theory seems to rely too heavily on language; the cognitivists deem emotions to be merely “affirmations and denials of propositions,” putting emotion beyond animals, babies, and so on— a conclusion which seems obviously implausible (Deigh, p.10, para.3). Cognitivist theories must acknowledge a fundamental difference between the thoughts in primitive emotions and those in distinctively human emotions (to avoid tying the nature of emotions solely to linguistic capacities), however they still struggle to account for how these different kinds of thought— given their significant dissimilarity— could both coherently be said to characterize the nature of emotions (Deigh, p.14, para.2).

The Darwinians (inspired by, but departing from, Darwin himself) believe emotions to be “neurophysiological event[s] whose manifestations typically include the facial and overt bodily movements that are the emotion’s true expressions” (Deigh, p.18, para.1). Using this model, it is clear how humans and some animals can share similar emotional responses, as they have common evolutionary origins (Deigh, p.19, para.1). In contrast to the problem the cognitivists face in reconciling propositional intentionality with primitive emotions which predate language use, the challenge for the Darwinians is then to explain how emotions can be intentional states without relying on propositional thought (of which many animals seem incapable). A significant problem also arises concerning the intelligibility condition of emotions; Deigh contends that for something to be the object of an emotion, it must appear to the subject in a way that makes the feeling intelligible, or be thought to possess a property that makes the emotion intelligible— if a subject has the neurophysiological response indicative of one emotion, but feels his emotions intelligibly to be another, then “the Darwinians must insist on his feeling some emotion that he is in fact not feeling,” posing a fundamental incompatibility with intentionality (Deigh, p.22, para.1).

      Emerging research may be able to reveal, however, some way to bridge the gap between these two outlooks; the somatic marker hypothesis, proposed by Antonio Damasio, elucidates the relationship between the body, decision making, and emotion. He states that emotion “allows you to mark things as good, bad, or indifferent,” (i.e., to assign somatic markers), which builds a ‘database’ upon which decisions are made; our decisions are swayed not only by past factual information, but also “whether or not what we felt was good or bad […] That tandem of fact and associated emotion is critical.” (Damasio, 1:41) The most famous study in support of this hypothesis is the Iowa Gambling Task, in which while normal people acquire an anticipatory galvanic skin response to risky bets before they even consciously recognize the risk, people with damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortices will never acquire this response (i.e., they will play until bankruptcy) (Dempsey, slide 8). From an evolutionary perspective, this link between emotions and decision making makes sense; like heuristics, emotions, “rather than having you think through the problem, would deliver a solution and make sure that you would act right […] if there is an opportunity, emotion is going to make sure that you, at some level, know that it’s there and that you’re going to have the tendency to act on it— and if there is a threat, you are going to be alerted to it; even before you’re alerted to the threat as such […] it happens nonconscious[ly], then you take consciousness of it.” (Damasio, 5:35) The somatic marker hypothesis provides strong support for theories of emotion in which somatic states play a prominent role— such as the James-Lange theory defended by Jesse Prinz in Embodied Emotions, which states that “emotions are perceptions (conscious or unconscious) of patterned changes in the body” (Prinz, p.45, para.2); the fact that patients who have sustained damage to the VMPC are virtually unable to make even simple decisions would indicate that said somatic responses are essential to evaluative judgments. This works in favour of theories which ground emotion chiefly in the somatic before any cognition occurs, and potentially poses issues for judgment or cognition-based ones.

      Jennifer Robinson, in Emotion: Biological Fact or Social Construction? , investigates the value of judgment theory (similar to the cognitivism covered by Deigh), and the theory does seemingly have a number of strengths. That emotions are based upon beliefs (for example, fear that a predator is threatening, or joy that someone is being kind to us) seems plausible, especially considering, as noted by Solomon, that “change in the belief or judgment seems to entail a change in the emotion and/or the abandonment of the emotion” (Robinson, p.28, para.2). Emotions are also subject to evaluation in a way that involuntary feelings, such as pain after being hit, are not; we say that certain emotional responses are reasonable or unreasonable given the circumstances, which implies an element of judgment (Robinson, p.29, para.1). 

However, the theory is imperfect; primarily, it seems that while there is a clear connection, there is no inherent link between judgment and emotion. For example, emotions are still possible where judgments seemingly are not— say, in the emotions of babies (Robinson, p.32, para.2). Other factors which work against judgment theories include the presence of unlearned fears (of the unfamiliar, for example)(Robinson, p.32, para.3), and the many studies of Zajonc which show that things which are ‘subcepted’ (i.e., presented in such a way that the subject has no conscious experience of them) may also induce emotional response— indicating that these things are bypassing cognition (Robinson, p.33, para.2). Thus, while there is certainly evaluative cognition involved in the experience of emotion, it is not a prerequisite; indeed, it seems rather that the somatic response is the prerequisite which makes evaluation or judgment possible. Robinson summarizes that “the initial response to fear is generated by an ‘emotional appraisal’ in the amygdala that happens very fast and prior to cognitive intervention,” whereas “the subsequent slower ‘cognitive appraisal’ can identify the stimulus more carefully, assess the appropriateness of the prior automatic response, and presumably attempt to modify and control both the initial appraisal and the organism’s subsequent responses” (Robinson, p.36, para.3). In other words, Robinson’s position on the matter is one which seems to tie up many loose ends: emotional responses are triggered by affective appraisals (of simple or more complex stimuli) leading to physiological changes, which is then followed by subsequent cognitive processes that may modify the overall emotional experience (Robinson, p.41, para.2). This is in alignment with Damasio’s statements of an initially unconscious response of which we later become conscious. Thus, while cognition and judgment play a role in our emotions, “it is always an [automatic] affective appraisal that sets off an emotion process” (Robinson, p.43, para.3).

      Both cognitivist (or judgment) and Darwinian theories paint a picture of emotions that is too one-dimensional; as with most conflicting theories, the answer lies somewhere in the meeting of the two. The primary issue with the cognitivists’ approach is not the proposition that emotions are intentional— which, as noted by Deigh, seems undeniable— but rather that intentionality relies upon propositional thought. The case against non-propositional thought proposed by Deigh is unsatisfactory; he dismisses the argument that thoughts in primitive emotions are like thoughts in distinctively human emotions (only lacking propositional form), questioning what makes these thoughts alike other than being part of intentional states of the mind— in Deigh’s view, this does not explain what specifically makes them similar (Deigh, p.11, para.3). But in fact, what is unclear is why Deigh believes this is not sufficient; if both animal and human emotions can be shown to have an object and to be directed toward something, then the issue of intentionality has been solved. The degree to which any complex thought can be achieved without language is questionable (as is addressed by Descartes (Deigh, p.14, para.1)), because language allows for levels of abstraction not available to purely image-based thought, but it is certainly sufficient for the purposes of intentional emotions. In order to defend animals as emotional beings, one need only demonstrate that they experience the same basic emotions as humans, which incorporate some aspect of intentionality. Therefore, the fact that there may be some emotions which depend upon highly complex abstract concepts, and are thus only accessible to humans, does not negate the fact that animals do experience emotions. Indeed, perhaps what the animals are lacking is not the emotion, but what Robinson identifies as the cognition which follows the physiological change, which may mediate the response and allow for a more sophisticated experience. In other words, by divorcing propositional, language-based thought from intentionality, we may be able to reach a theory of emotion which incorporates both the somatic and the cognitive. With a narrow view of intentionality out of the way, it becomes clear that views offered by Robinson, Damasio, and others—which illustrate the intimate relationship between neurophysiological stimulus response and cognitive appraisal in the emotional process— provide a comprehensive and plausible picture of emotion. 

      In summary, it seems neither cognitivist nor Darwinian perspectives can provide a complete and satisfactory account of emotions. The limitation lies, in part, with the cognitivist insistence on language-based thought as a prerequisite for intentionality; by exploring ways in which intentionality can exist beyond language, a more comprehensive theory of emotion may emerge. Furthermore, research illuminating the relationship between neurophysiological responses and cognitive analysis seems to mediate in favour of a blending of the two; rather than cognition preceding somatic response or vice versa, the most plausible account seems to be one of a reciprocal process of one informing the other. This approach promises a more nuanced understanding of the intricate nature of emotion than those provided by the cognitivist or Darwinian theories.